Section 1. Privatisation of Public Policy -The growth of business forums in

Brussels.
The creation of the TABD is the continuation of a trend towards direct firm lobbying and US style business-government forums in Brussels. The dramatic boom in businesses direct lobbying of EU institutions can be attributed to the increased regulatory competencies of the European Commission and the introduction of qualified majority voting at the Council of Ministers in the aftermath of the Single Market programme. Between 1987 Between -1997 , over 350 firms established direct European lobbying capabilities and 3,000 public interests and 1600 business pressure groups gravitated to Brussels. Faced with this increasingly crowded lobbying environment, the European Commission began to restrict access to the policy process and created new policy committees and industrial forums. Firms that had proven they provided fast and reliable sources of information were invited to join.
The high profile success of the Martin Bangemann forums in telecommunications and pharmaceuticals has led many Commissioners and Director Generals to create their own constellation of industrialists. This need for an industrial constituency has continued with the new Commission, with one of our interviewed firms noting that it had been invited to join Commissioner Liikanen's forum initiative on "Enterprise and Innovation".
The creation of these new forums, which included many of the original European Round Table ( 2. Constituency for Commissioners and the Director Generals.
Legitimacy vis-à-vis European
Parliament.
Policy implementers in Member
States.
5. Use firms in a diplomatic function at the international organisational level. working groups covering a number of different sectors and issues with each sub-issue group co-ordinated by a joint EU/US company chair. 
Group 4. Small and Medium sized enterprises (SMES):
This is a sub forum to enable small businesses to contribute their perspective to the TABD agenda.
Group 5. New Digital Economy. Focuses on ensuring that there are secure and efficient developments in global e-commerce. Following the Commission and US government calls it has concentrated on personal data, encryption and electronics authentication.
Source: www.TADB.com -Mid year report 1999.
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Meeting once a year, the CEOs and senior executives' come together to discuss, and make recommendations that foster transatlantic trade and investment opportunity.
Focusing on the removal of costly inefficiencies caused by excess regulation, duplication and deficiencies, the TABD attempts to identify areas of consensus for EU and US business and government. In recent years it has achieved notable success in the areas of mutual recognition and harmonisation of standards, active leadership of e-commerce and standardisation of "third generation" wireless telecommunications systems.
The CEOs, having agreed to the broad agenda, delegate the operationalisation of the policy process to specialist working groups, which are co-ordinated by the secretariat.
The secretariat, operates as a central spoke for the CEOs by organising the scope of contact with European Commission, US government officials, MEPs and US Congress. It takes responsibility for organising the annual conferences of the CEOs and on a day to day basis acts as a contact point for the US/EU working group chairs.
The two secretariat offices total 5 people (3 in Brussels and 2 in Washington) and operate jointly as far as this is possible. Numbers in the secretariat have been limited to minimise overhead costs, reduce the bureaucracy and facilitate speed of action, as there is no chain of command. This skeleton secretariat works by drawing resources of the companies of the various working groups' chairmen.. However, conversely, the annual changes in company chairs and the policy-making lag restrict in January and February as individuals are brought up to speed on issues.
The goal of the TABD is to get government talking to business. This is very much a company driven process and one of the difficult issues has been how to involve associations. This is not a straightforward procedural question as the TABD is very much based on a 'company state'as defined by Grant (2000) . 
TABD Insiders and Outsiders: Case of intellectual property rights in the Pharmaceuticals Sector.
In 1992 the European Generic Drug Association (EGA) was formed, primarily as a single issue group focused on intellectual property rights and patent expiry times.
Reacting to the Bolar agreement, which allowed generic drug firms to build up capacity in the period prior to the expiry of a patent, the EGA brought together some 400 SMEs in a sector that had traditionally created ad-hoc lobbying alliances. The ICH and TABD, it also pushed the State Department to tone down its links to the TABD. In parallel with this alliance building strategy, the NPA implied that it would take anti-trust proceeding against the TABD on the grounds of collusion and the EGA threatened the European Commission with the EU onsbudman in Strasbourg. These lobbying strategies were high profile and intentionally loud as the generic sector wanted to demonstrate to government and public that a single unified sector position was not being presented. By undermining the reputation of the TADB in the courts, its use as a fast and credible forum for big business and government would be reduced.
Moreover, the strategy was also aimed at influencing the sectors within the TABD that had a consensus position and did not want the negotiation process slowed down with a return to intergovernmental negotiations or worse totally discredited.
Significantly, Bangemann continued to resist the enlargement of the TABD to allow SMEs and generic drug producers even with internal unrest within the wider organisation of the TABD (interviews Large pharmaceutical firm and EGA). Hence the EGA, acting as a focal point for the generic CEOs, has had to take a lead as a policy shaper for the generic voice within the TABD. The EFPIA still attempted to set the agenda, but now as an insider the EGA can veto if still not initiate policy. In sum, the above lobbying case demonstrates that new global public policy is increasingly complex with actors attempting to establish multiple identities and alliances to access multiple organisations. While some issues may remain embedded in nation states with traditional association arrangements, others will require more disaggregated "issue focused" responses. In both cases Coen (1998) 
Conclusions.
Governments are increasingly dependent on large firms for fast and effective information. In the case of EU institutions this is magnified by the need for actors to implement directives and a political constituency to legitimise their policies. Perhaps then, the new corporate political strategy and global policy-making can be characterised as a company state relationship as we have observed in the US and UK.
However, while this policy regime has given business a favoured place at the table, due in part to the nature of the issues, it does not mean that governments are not aware of the risks of capture.
Our empirical findings have shown that before industrial forums are legitimised within the political process and given favoured access, they must be seen to be representative of the sectors' views and capture a wider constituency of public interests. Business, however, has to weigh the advantages of fast access and focused goals (a short run business time frame) against the long run political considerations of the administrations. For example the lame duck president was seen as a concern of the Whether TABD will still be around in five years time is a more open question than one might suppose. It is very much a results driven process and companies might become quickly dissatisfied if they do not achieve the kinds of outcomes they expect.
Its advocates would not want to see a dynamic process ossify into an organisation following set routines. Pressure to make the process more inclusive may make it less effective as the more encompassing an organisation becomes the more likely it is to produce consensual lowest common denominator outcomes. It may be that the statecorporate interface in 21st century politics will be less characterised by long surviving organisations as typified by the traditional trade association and more by loosely organised processes which achieve a set of goals and then disappear or mutate into something new.
